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ABSTRACT
In this work we shall attempt an excursus across fundamentally different streams of modern 
interpretations of the “ primitive  entities” constituting the social fabrics of economic systems. Behind 
each specific interpretative story, there is a set of ceteris paribus assumptions and also some fictitious 
tale on a 'once upon a time' reconstruction of the theoretical primitives of the story itself. Pushing it to 
the extreme, as we see it, there are in the social sciences two archetypal (meta) tales. The first says, 
more or less, that 'once upon a time' there were individuals with reasonably structured and coherent 
preferences, with adequate cognitive algorithms to solve the decision-action problems at hand, and  
with self-seeking restrictions on preferences themselves. They met in some openings in the forest and, 
conditional on the technologies available, undertook some sort of general equilibrium trading or, as an 
unavoidable second best, built organizations in order to deal with technological non-convexities, 
trading difficulties, contract enforcements, etc. In the alternative tale, 'once upon a time' there were 
immediately factors of socialization and preference-formation of individuals,  including some 
institutions like families shaping desires, representations and, possibly, cognitive abilities. Non-
exchange mechanisms of interactions appear in the explanation from the start: authority, violence and 
persuasion of parents upon children; obedience; schools; churches; and, generally, the adaptation to 
particular social roles. Here 'institutions' are the primitives, while 'preferences' and the very idea  of 
'rationality' are derived entities.
Which of the primitive tale is chosen bears far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of socio-
economic organizational forms and their dynamics, and involves different theoretical commitments on 
the interactions between agencies and structures in human affairs. In this work , we argue for the need 
of moving away from rationality-cum-equilibrium interpretations and of focusing on the varying 
balances between self’orginizing dynamics and institution-shaped constraints .
Keywords
Institutions, rationality, self-organization, hierarchies,power, endogenous preferences, motivations
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1. INTRODUCTION
If there is an ultimate difference between social and natural sciences, it probably does not regard the 
methodology of the analysis but, even deeper, the “primitives” of the theory and their awareness by 
the practitioners. 
A classical physicist starts from bodies, masses, distances, etc., henceforth tells a story of forces, etc.. 
A quantum mechanics physicist starts from with particles and waves. An evolutionary biologist starts 
with organic molecules and goes all the way up to multicellular entities, species, etc., all linked by 
mechanisms of mutation, recombination and selection, possibly on multidimensional nested scales.
What does one have in social sciences? In our view we have much less in terms of commonly 
accepted primitives, together with a much greater hubris and  casualness in moving from the 
primitives to the formulation of analytical “tales” accounting for the historical patterns of social and 
economic change. 
In the following, we shall attempt an excursus across fundamentally different streams of modern 
interpretations of the primitives of the entities constituting the social fabrics of economic systems. 
It is useful to start by pointing out  the extreme boundaries on the distribution of “primitive” 
theoretical building-blocks which are set, on the one side, by nearly theological axiomatizations about 
human behaviour derived from simple invariant principles (resulting in an unconditionally self-
seeking forward-looking rationality a la Becker (1976), or older religious theories on grace, 
predestination and temptation) and, on the opposite side, by purely 'functionalist' or holistic theories 
of collective dynamics.
Interestingly enough, while there might be little scope for a constructive debate with fundamentalist 
believers, most of the challenging controversies concern precisely the relative interpretative merits of 
theories, all indeed acknowledging some role to both motivational microfoundations and system-level 
effects, which, however, differ profoundly in the ways they describe and combine these two levels of 
analysis. In our view, a fruitful reassessment of 'foundations' rests precisely at this level ,which is 
where the 'grand' debates in social sciences have found their ultimate ground — from Hobbes to 
Smith all the way to  Durkheim, Weber , Veblen, Schumpeter and Schmidt , just to name a few ). 
Without any ambition of thoroughness, let us try to highlight some of these foundational issues.
2. ON THE ULTIMATE PRIMITIVES
Behind each specific interpretative story, there is a set of ceteris paribus assumptions and also some 
fictitious tale on a 'once upon a time' reconstruction of the theoretical primitives of the story itself. 
Needless to say, most of (but not all!) scholars realize that the tales are just tales, but they still 
influence the way that interpretative stories are told, the selection of the dominant variables, the 
modelling assumptions, etc.
Pushing it to the extreme, as we see it, there are in the social sciences two archetypal (meta) tales. The 
first says, more or less, that 'once upon a time' there were individuals with reasonably structured and 
coherent preferences, with adequate cognitive algorithms to solve the decision-action problems at 
hand, and (in most cases) with self-seeking restrictions on preferences themselves. They met in some 
openings in the forest and, conditional on the technologies available, undertook some sort of general 
equilibrium trading or, as an unavoidable second best, built organizations in order to deal with 
technological non-convexities, trading difficulties, contract enforcements, etc. Here, clearly, the rough 
'primitives' of the tale are preferences, endowments and given technologies (of production and 
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exchange), while 'institutions' or 'organizations' are derived entities.  In this ultimately functionalist 
approach, institutions emerge to address very specific economic needs of society (Ogilvie, 2007). The 
research agenda for moving from primitives to derived entities is straightforward: in order to 
understand institutions we need to reconstruct the fundamental economic problem that they are 
addressing and to reconstruct the interactions among fully rational, self-interested individuals that has 
brought them into being.  As Sheilagh Ogilvie aptly puts it, within this framework, “whatever is, is 
right” (Ogilvie, 2007). That is,  a sort of  ‘Hegel for the shopkeeper’ (‘ whatever is rational is real , 
whatever is real is rational …’) !
This research agenda has indeed being pursued vigorously by at least two generations of economists 
and economic historians, so that, today, a wide array of institutions such as craft guilds, 
sharecropping, serfdom, etc. has been reinterpreted using this “efficiency” framework. Note that the 
approach implicitly contains a view on the drivers of institutional change: when the primitives 
(preferences, endowments and technologies) change the prevailing institution may become no more 
efficient and so a new meeting in the opening of the forest is necessary in order to find more suitable 
arrangements. 
In the second and alternative tale, the premises are radically different: 'once upon a time' there were 
immediately factors of socialization and preference-formation of individuals,  including some 
institutions like families, tribes,  etc. shaping desires, representations and, possibly, cognitive abilities.
Non-exchange mechanisms of interactions appear in the explanation from the start: authority, violence 
and persuasion of parents upon children; obedience; schools; churches; and, generally, the adaptation 
to particular social roles. Here 'institutions' are the primitives, while 'preferences' and the very idea  of 
'rationality' are derived entities.  These notions are very familiar indeed  to all social disciplines, 
ranging from anthropology to social psycology to sociology ( picking three out of a multitude: see 
Laing and Esterson ,1970, on the family ; Milgram, 1974, on obedience ; and B. Moore,1958, on 
social submission ), except contemporary economics  !
Certainly, with enough refinements, both basic tales become analytically respectable and in many 
situations observationally indistinguishable. So, for example, in the 'rational' tale one can easily admit 
that preferences, too, are endogenous, but on a longer time scale. However, in principle, institutions 
and organizations ought to be considered relatively plastic and adaptable, while the interests, 
motivations and menus of strategies available to the agents ought to be relatively invariant. 
Conversely, in the 'institutionalist’ tale it is easy to account for the influence of individual preferences 
and strategies upon the evolution of social organizations. However, one is inclined to view institutions 
as the relatively inertial entities and agents' motivations and behaviours as comparatively flexible and 
adaptive.
Foundational tales obviously influence also the derived interpretive heuristics. Consider the problem 
of 'why does one observe organization x at time t?. In the first perspective, one would start answering 
by focusing upon the interests of the agents involved in such an organization, the tasks that the 
organization is meant to handle and the technologies available, and then try to impute its existence to 
the intentional efforts of the agents to 'do their best', given the constraints. (The exercise, as 
Granovetter (1995) remarks, is often riddled with a good deal of ideological reasoning). 1 In contrast, 
in the second perspective, one would look much more carefully at the organization(s) that existed at 
1 As noted by Ogilvie (2007) in the strongest versions, the efficient account of institutions is completely 
oblivious of their potential re-distributional role among social groups.  
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time (t-1), at the linkages between organization x and other institutional entities, and then try to tell an 
explicitly dynamic story on how one got from the state at (t-1) to the state at t. In this respect, the 
answer to 'why something exists' relies a good deal on the account of how it came about.
Note that we are not suggesting that the first story is institution-free and the second is agent-free. 
Consider, for example, Williamson (1995) (which certainly belongs to the 'rationalist' camp as defined 
here): he emphasizes that institutions intervene in the parametrization of the economic problem at 
hand — in his case, the transaction-governance problem— and also exert a (weak) influence on the 
characteristics of the agents. Of course, they play a more prominent role in any 'institutionalist' story, 
and they do so by shaping and constraining the opportunities, incentives and motivations of the actors 
(Granovetter, 1995).2 We would add that they also help shape the representations that agents hold of 
what their interests are and of the instruments at their disposal to pursue them (i.e. their 'rationality').
The presumption in strong versions of the 'rationalist tale' is that agents somehow possess a kit of 
algorithmic devices sufficient to adequately represent the environment in which they operate and to 
choose the appropriate courses of action. 'Boundedly rational' versions — such as Williamson's in this 
issue or the contributions that come under the heading of 'evolutionary games' in economics — relax 
the assumption by allowing computational and memory limitations, but still tend to define 'bounded' 
rationality as an imperfect approximation to the 'unbounded' one.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 'institutionalist tale' finds intuitive links with all those 
inquiries, such as cognitive psychology and artificial sciences, which start from the presumption of 
general (nearly ontological) gaps (a) between what one sees and believes, and 'what is really out 
there'; and (b) between what one could notionally do, given the environmental constraints and 
opportunities, and what one is actually capable of doing. As a consequence, in this perspective, the 
challenge to the theory is to investigate the nature and process of emergence of particular cognitive 
frames, interpretative categories, patterns of behaviours, routines, etc. (Within an enormous and 
diverse interdisciplinary literature, examples are Shafir and Tversky,1992, on reasoning and choice ; 
Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, on heuristics ; Holland et al. ,1986, and Lakoff,1987, on adaptive 
learning and category formation; and the analyses of behavioural routines in Nelson and Winter,1982; 
Cohen et al. ,1996; Dosi and Egidi,1991; Becker, 2005)
Related issues concern the separability between cognitive and motivational dimensions of decision-
making. Clearly, the 'rationalist tale' demands such separation between 'what one desires' (i.e. goals, 
utilities, etc.) and 'what one knows' (i.e. the assessment of the status of the environment and the means 
available to achieve given goals). Conversely, the 'institutionalist tale' is comfortable also with blurred 
coupled dynamics between the two, possibly yielding endogenous preferences, coexisting 
contradictory models of cognition and action in the heads of the same individuals, phenomena of 
cognitive dissonance, etc.3
2 A version of the 'institutionalist tale' trying to establish a detailed link between the behavioural motivations 
traditionally emphasized by 'rationalists' (such as sheer utility maximization), on the one hand, and other 
motivational factors (including moral and ethical ones), on the other, is 'socio-economics' (see Etzioni, 1988). 
Incidentally, note that, as the latter approach shows, non-utilitarian motivations can be brought into the picture 
without giving up 'rational' (at least in the sense of purposeful and coherent) decision-making. But see also 
below.
3 Relevant discussions in these respects are Cohen et al. (1972), Earl (1983, 1992), Elster (1979, 1983). A 
thorough introduction is in March (1994).
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Furthermore, the “rationalist tale” implies, as noted by McCloskey, that economic self-interest must 
be the predominant motivational drive underlying all economic choices (McCloskey, 1998).  In 
McCloskey ‘s view this strong assumption is at odds with Adam Smith’s view who,  in his Theory of 
moral sentiments (1759), developed a rich taxonomy of drivers of behaviours in which “utility” – 
roughly approximated by his notion of “prudence” – played a relatively minor part. Other relevant 
“pagan” and “Christian” drivers ranging from love to honour, from charitas to dignity played a major 
role in characterizing what human beings do even in the economic sphere (McCloskey, 1998).  The 
key issue is that given the interactions among motivational drives in the decision making process (and 
possibly even in the representation of the choice itself), approaches whose “primitives” assume 
exclusively economic self-interest as motivation can easily result in exceedingly reductionist 
interpretations of the dynamics of social change (McCloskey, 1998 and 2016). 4  
 We mention these basic dichotomies in the underlying views of social interactions because they also 
cut across the contributions that follow and might be where some of the interpretative divergences 
ultimately rest .5
3. POWER, AUTHORITY AND HIERARCHIES
A deeply related 'foundational' issue concerns the nature of hierarchies, the notion of authority and the 
associated notion of power. Again, for the sake of simplicity, let us suggest two caricaturally simple 
archetypes.
The first one proposes that (a) the notion of 'power' does not have any clear analytical status; (b) the 
basic unit of analysis ought to remain as much as possible that of transactions; and (c) organizations 
are primarily governance structures. Call this model the exchange view of interactions and 
organizations. The second, which we shall (improperly) call the political view, holds on the contrary 
that (a) an essential, although not unique, feature of organizations is their authoritative structure ; (b) 
authority relations are inherently different from exchange relations; and (c) power  has an autonomous 
interpretative dimension.
Here we shall adopt a quite broad definition of power. 
First, power entails the ability of some agent (the “ruler”, the authority) to determine the set of actions 
available to the other agents (the “ruled”). 
Second, it involves the possibility of the authority to veto the decisions or intentions of the ruled ones. 
4 An intriguing example of the interplay of motivational drivers affecting consumption choices is provided by 
the recent historical study of English consumers in the 1750-1821 period by Horrel Humphries and Sneath 
(2015).  It is worth quoting their conclusions: “Our findings underline the importance of fashion and tastes, 
which exerted an independent influence on the ownership of all the items that we examined, but make space too 
for price and income effect. The relative magnitude of fashion, price and income varied according to the specific 
item considered, but none should be omitted in an account of the consumer revolution, which pour evidence 
suggests involved a complex interplay between desires and differentiation, and aspiration and affordability” 
(Horrel, Humphries and Sneath, 2015, p. 855). 
5 Clearly, the majority of economists tend to be more comfortable with the first tale and sociologists with the 
second. However, it is deeply misleading, in my view, to identify the dichotomy with disciplinary boundaries (a 
bit along the lines of Pareto, who equated economics and sociology with the study of 'rational' and 'irrational' 
behaviours respectively). In fact, we personally consider it good news that these diverse perspectives 
increasingly affect all social disciplines.
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Third, power relates to the ability of the authority to influence or command the choice within the 
“allowed” choice set (i.e. the span of control of the “ruled”), according to the deliberations of the ruler 
himself (this definition echoes in some ways the analysis contained in Luhmann (1979)). Here, in 
these respects, the units of analysis are the dimensionality and boundaries of the choice sets and the 
mechanisms by which authority is enforced. As Herbert Simon puts it: “Authority in organizations is 
not used exclusively, or even mainly, to command specific actions. Most often, the command takes the 
form of a result to be produced (“repair this hinge”), or a principle to be applied (“all purchases must 
be made through the purchasing department”) or goal constraints (“manufacture as cheaply as 
possible consistent with quality”)” (Simon 1991, p. 31).
Fourth, the most subtle exercise of power concerns the influence of the authority upon the 
preferences of the ruled themselves, so that, in Max Weber’s words, the conduct of the ruled is such 
that it is “as if the rules had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its own 
sake” (Weber 1978, p. 946). That easily accounts for the fact that “organizations can be highly 
productive even though the relation between their goals and the material rewards received by 
employees, if it exists at all, is extremely indirect and tenuous” (Simon 1991, p. 38).
Obedience, docility, identification in the role and in the organization are central elements of such 
processes of adaptive learning and coordination (classic discussion of these processes are in Milgram 
(1974), Simon (1976),  (1981) and (1993), Lindblom (1977), Lukes (2005), Moore (1958)). Docility 
offers the inclination to “depend on suggestions, recommendation, persuasion and information 
obtained through social channels as a major basis for choice” (Simon 1993, p. 156). And, 
emphatically, such inputs are not inputs to an inferential (let alone Bayesian) decision process. Both 
cognitive frames and preferences are endogenous to the very process of social adaptation and social 
learning.
It is crucial to note that the social endogeneity of identity building is exactly the opposite to any type 
of decision-theoretic model: one learns socially not only what one can do, but, more fundamentally, 
what one wants, the very interpretation of the natural and social environment one lives in, and, 
ultimately, the very self-perception and identity of the agents. Indeed, the conjecture we explore in 
Dosi and Marengo (2015) is that in many circumstances such processes of cognitive and behavioural 
adaptation yield also much more efficient and quicker coordination patterns.
The political view, of course, does not claim to be exhaustive: command and exchange coexist in 
different forms within and outside organizations. But it claims — at least as we interpret it — that the 
sole consideration of exchange relations prevents a full understanding of what goes on within the 
'organizational black box', of the boundaries between organizations and of organizational dynamics. 
Indeed, exchange activities are not the prevailing ones in all domains of social life.
Note also that the dichotomy between the exchange and political views is not entirely orthogonal to 
the previous one between 'rationalist' and 'institutionalist' foundations. In fact, the political view 
demands microfoundations involving socially adaptive preferences and behavioural modes (such as 
'obedience' or 'identification with the role' and with the authority)6 quite at odds with the rationalist 
tale. Conversely, any strong version of the latter almost inevitably leads to the interpretation of 
seemingly authoritative relations as the outcome of some sort of voluntary meta-exchange by self-
interest seeking, forward-looking agents.
6 Classic discussions of these processes are in Milgram (1974), Simon (1976) and Lindblom (1977).
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Ultimately, the rationalist tale-cum-exchange view entails a sort of unitary and invariant anthropology, 
based on well-formed, consistent interests as the basic motivational drives and criteria for action. At 
the other extreme, the institutionalist tale-cum-political view is naturally consistent with the idea of an 
irreducible multiplicity of motivational dimensions, and, possibly, with multiple 'identities' coexisting 
within the same agent. So, for example, the latter perspective builds upon broad historical 
generalizations such as Hirschman's account of the changing balance between 'passions' and 'interests' 
in modern Western culture (Hirschman, 1977) or Sen's fascinating discussion of the (sometimes 
uneasy) coexistence between 'ethical' and 'economic' motives (Sen, 1987). The same phenomena 
would be interpreted in rationalist/exchange perspectives as varying restrictions on some sort of 
'enlarged utility functions' or changing 'social technologies' for the governance of exchanges and 
production.7
Moreover, the 'institutionalist' perspective would see exchanges themselves as embedded in particular 
institutions (e.g. 'the markets') whose origins and characteristics demand to be explained (on the 
notion of embeddedness, cf. Granovetter, 1985 and 1995). Finally, note that the political view is quite 
in tune with the picture of business firms provided by most organizational theorists and business 
economists alike (cf. Pfeffer, 1981; March and Simon, 1993).
4. WEAK AND STRONG INSTITUTIONALISM
From the choice of primitives stem major dichotomies on the very nature of organizations and 
institutions more generally. We summarize them in Tables 1 and 2.
In particular, in the latter we distinguish between a “weak” and a “strong” form of institutionalism, 
where the former has its roots in “exchange primitives” and includes the so-called neo- 
institutionalism (prominently represented by North and Williamson), while the latter has its roots in 
political and institutional primitives, with such noble ancestors as Veblen and Polanyi.
And indeed the two archetypes differ also in terms of the relative role attributed to “choice” vs. 
“structure” in the determination of behaviours and in terms of the importance of history in the 
dynamics of institutions in general and formal organizations in particular. In particular, they differ in 
terms of:
• role attributed to individual rationality in the development of collective institutions
• degree of path-dependency and inertia of institutions themselves
• relative analytical importance of choice vs. constraints in individual and collective behaviours
• importance and modes of influence of history and institutions upon preferences and 
behaviours
• nature of organizations in which agents operate
7 Of course, pushing the interpretation to the extreme, one reaches a Becker-type anthropology whereby, for 
example, the only remarkable difference between Adolf Hitler and Mother Theresa of Calcutta rests on diverse 
weights of the arguments of their (dimensionally identical) utility function and, analogously, the differences 
between Micronesian civilizations and L. A. yuppies can be reduced to differences in available social 
technologies.
8
Today, the neo-institutionalism paradigm (or weak institutionalism) is probably the predominant 
analytical outlook in economics. The success of the approach is possibly due by the adoption of a 
simple and straightforward representation of social institutions in terms of “rules of the game” (North, 
1991) combined with “rationalist tale” primitive. In this case, this amounts to standard economic 
assumptions concerning the rational behaviour of individuals (allowing to describe individual
Table 1 – Nature of Hierarchies
“Exchange” view “Political” view
No analytical status to the notion of power Essential features of organizations are patterns of 
power exercise and authority relations
Apparent “power relations” can be explained by 
asymmetric transactions
Power/authority relations are essentially different 
from exchange relations and therefore are also 
autonomous interpretative dimensions
Transactions are the basic units of analysis Units of analysis include knowledge, 
organizational forms, behavioural codes, 
routines, mental frames
Organizations are “veils” covering sets of 
contracts or bundles of incomplete contractual 
agreements
Organizations as different from and constitutive 
of exchange
Table 2 - “Weak” vs. “Strong” Institutionalism
Weak Institutionalism Strong Institutionalism
Role of institutions Parametrize system variables; 
provide menu of strategies
Also embed cognitive and 
behavioural patterns; shape 
identity of actors
Primitives of the theory Perfectly or boundedly rational 
agents
Institutions as primitives; forms 
of rationality and perception of 
self-interest as derived entities
Mechanisms of institutions 
formation
Mainly explicit and rational 
“constitutional” processes
Partly unintentional self-
organization processes
Efficiency properties Institutions perform useful 
coordinating and governance 
functions, often viewed as 
Institutions are ‘carriers of 
history’, provide rules of the 
game and reproduce path-
9
equilibria in some game dependently irrespectively of 
efficiency
decision-making using either parametric optimization algorithms or game theory, in cases, in contexts 
where strategic interaction assumers relevance).8 
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that, at least since the mid 1990s, the neo-institutionalist approach 
has been progressively refined in two main directions. 
The first direction is the systematic application of the neo-institutionalist approach to historical cases 
of institutional change, with a particular view at examining the connection between institutional set-
ups and economic performance. This stream of research is epitomized by the contributions of  
Acemoglu, Robinson and their associates (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Interestingly enough, in order to work out a plausible connection between the 
stylized tale of institutions emerging from a “social contract” among free, self-interested and rational 
individuals with the actual historical record providing ample evidence of the emergence and 
persistence of institutional set-ups characterized by inequality and relationships of domination, 
Acemoglu and Robinson are forced to introduce a distinction between political and economic 
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). In this adapted framework, economic 
institutions are still essentially defined as the “rules of the game” in the economic sphere (e.g. 
property rights) endorsed by state in any given moment. Political institutions are, instead, the  “rules 
of the game” governing the power of different social groups in shaping both economic and political 
“rules of the game” in any given moment. Changes in political institutions are essentially an outcome 
of the  conflict among different social groups. Hence, whenever “narrow” elites have the power to 
dominate the political process, it is likely that the a country will be characterized by “extractive 
economic institutions” establishing relations of dominations between different social groups and by 
sub-optimal economic  performances. In this way, the neo-institutionalist research programme moves 
away from the characterization of the processes of institutional change in terms of the negotiated 
“constitutional” agreements. Somewhat paradoxically, however, in most cases this results in nesting a 
very simplified “vulgar” Marxist view of political history into neoclassical microfoundations (cf. 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).9
There is second major theme in the research programme of Acemoglu and Robinson which is worth 
noticing: the study of the empirical connection between various types of institutions and economic 
performance. In most cases this is carried out using synthetic and extremely crude indicators 
representing different institutional configurations (eg, Polity Instrumental Variables type of data for 
representing political institutions).  
In this perspective, most of the  efforts  have been devoted in the design of empirical frameworks 
which could ensure to tackle effectively the issue of the potential endogeneity of the institutional 
variable with respect to economic performance.  In general the key finding of Acemoglu and 
Robinson and their associates is that economic institutions establishing secure and clearly defined 
property rights and a smooth functioning of markets are to be regarded as the major source of long-
8 For a very perceptive analysis of the connections between “neo-institutionalism” and neoclassical economics. 
see McCloskey (2016).  
9 For a devastating review of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), see Vries (2012)
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run economic growth. This, of course, is a predicament that most neoclassical economists have put 
forward for long time. The success enjoyed by Acemoglu and Robinson arises from the widespread 
impression that their research has finally provided a rigorous analytical and empirical background for 
this notion, In fact, at closer inspection, the approach of Acemoglu and Robinson, despite its 
sophistication, seems not able to provide major insights both on the processes of institutional change 
and on the connection between institutions and economic performance. The major limit is that the 
approach provides a characterization of institutional set-ups that is extremely crude, despite its 
apparent clarity. , Acemoglu and Robinson do not take into account the complex relationship between 
institutional set-ups and their outcomes both in terms of economic performance and inequality. For 
example let us consider an institutions such as medieval guilds.  It turns out that, the economic 
interpretation is far from obvious. On the one hand, the institution can be seen simply as barrier to 
entry in production protecting the rents of incumbents. On the other hand, in the medieval economy, 
guilds were performing a number of other functions such as enhancing the transmission of skills or 
mitigating credit market imperfections (Ogilvie, 2007). As a result, it becomes difficult to ascribe to 
any institutions a specific “function”  within the economic and social system and, relatedly, to provide 
a comprehensive  assessment of its political and economic effecs, without taking the wider context in 
which the institution was operating (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). Furthermore, each institution is likely 
to interact in complex ways with other institutions.   All this suggests that providing characterizations 
of institutional set-ups using generic terms such as “secure property rights”, “state capacity”, etc. run 
the risk of conflating under the same heading highly heterogeneous phenomena.  This shortcoming 
clearly also affects the construction of synthetic quantitative indicators of institutional set-ups.  
The other “neo-institutionalist” direction is the attempt of including a cultural dimension in the 
process of institutional formation The main approach in this vein is Greif (2007). Again, prima facie, 
given our discussion in the previous section, this seems to be a promising development. However, it 
should be noted that the cultural dimension is essentially introduced in terms of “parametric” 
restrictions in the game theoretic framework, that is, the matrix of economic pay-offs becomes 
conditioned by a number of “exogenously” given cultural traits (for example, the existence of 
“collectivist” or “individualistic” attitudes).  The behavioural of individuals is still described in terms 
of straightforward economic maximization. Again, this is a far-cry from the complex approach to 
decision making of the “institutionalist tale” that we have discussed in the first sections. Furthermore, 
the empirical operationalization of the approach is doubtful. In most cases, the parameters of the game 
do not lend themselves to a straightforward empirical characterization (Clark, 2007). Hence, again the 
approach is dangerously on the border of the “functionalist fallacy” of attributing to institutional set-
ups specific functions, on the grounds of the existence of some abstract game-theoretic equilibrium. 10 
5. ORIGINS, DYNAMICS AND EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF ORGANIZATIONS
Consider the question of 'why organization x exists'. As already mentioned, there are two types of 
answer. One involves an explicit account of the dynamics (i.e. how it got to become what it is). The 
second answer derives necessary and sufficient reasons for its existence from the tasks it performs and 
its efficiency properties. With the former methodology, admittedly it might be quite difficult to 
achieve general theoretical propositions, since it involves the identification of classes of processes and 
sets of initial conditions yielding specific classes of outcomes. But, with the second methodology, 
functionalist or teleological fallacies are an easy temptation, as vigorously argued by Granovetter 
(1995) (i.e. 'organization x exists because it is good at performing function a). This need not 
necessarily be the case, but then the challenge is to show that functional efficiency is a robust 
10 For a criticism of Greif’s interpretation of the coalition of the Maghrebi traders, see Ogilve and Carus (2014, 
pp. 411-416).  
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outcome of either intentional constructive processes or collective, unintentional mechanisms of 
selection among a variety of alternative organizational solutions.
It is fair to say that, so far, neither proof is available. On the constructive, intentional side, the game-
theoretic route does not seem able to deliver the goods. Without entering into any detailed discussion 
of the state of the art, one should just recall the hurdles facing selection among multiple equilibria or 
the implications of the Folk theorem in repeated games (which basically says that any behavioural 
sequence that one observes can be interpreted as an equilibrium strategy). All this applies to 
interactive setups involving individual agents and, plausibly, even more to collective entities such as 
formal organizations or institutions in general.
Alternatively, the selection route is the most rudimentary form of a dynamic, evolutionary argument. 
It dates back at least to Friedman's as-if proposition, according to which, due to some unspecified 
selection mechanism, observed behavioural traits (and, implicitly, also organizational forms) can be 
interpreted as if they were the outcome of an explicit optimization process, since no other behaviour 
would survive in equilibrium.
However, apart from a lot of hand-waving, the analytical results are mainly negative: only under quite 
restrictive conditions on the selection space, selection mechanisms and initial conditions does such an 
outcome obtain (cf. Winter 1971, and the critical surveys in Silverberg 1988 and Hodgson 1993).
To sum up, it seems to us that no matter what kind of explanation one offers as to why particular 
organizations exist, an answer to the 'how' question is unavoidable. This, in turn, implies some explicit 
dynamic account of how formal organizations — and, more generally, institutions — emerge and 
change over time. To be brief, let us continue to reason in terms of dichotomous archetypes. The first 
archetype — call it the constitutional model—is based on the idea of intentional interactions among 
purposeful, forward-looking agents who try to establish ground rules for their cooperative endeavours 
In opposition, one may conceive the origin and evolution of organizations primarily in terms of 
collective, largely unintentional outcomes of interactions — call this the self-organization model (with 
respect to organizational evolution, see Warglien 1995). Needless to say, empirical processes of 
organizational formation are likely to involve different mixtures between the two modes, but the 
formal study of the properties of each archetype adds important insights to the understanding of which 
kinds of interaction mechanism yield which kinds of feasible outcome. Indeed, Ostrom and Crawford 
(1995), with many other  Ostrom et al ,  are  among the best , most fruitful ,  examples  of ththe 
intertwining of both processes..  
Whatever dynamic story one tells, it naturally involves the question of where the dynamics is leading 
to (which economists, perhaps too easily, confine to the nature of asymptotic properties of the 
process). And, symmetrically, one may ask the question of whether one would have got to a certain 
observed state, say, a certain organizational setup at time /, irrespectively of any initial conditions, 
further back in time. As is known, when initial conditions matter and their effect is not vanishing but 
possibly self-reinforcing over time, one says that the process is path-dependent. Hence, simplifying to 
the extreme, an integral part of the explanation of 'where one is going' or 'why we are here' is the 
account of 'where we come from'. Conversely, note that a necessary (although not sufficient) 
condition for a 'teleological' interpretation of an observed organizational phenomenon is the lack of 
path-dependency. As David puts it,
whether the focus falls upon the supposed evolutionary tendency toward efficiency in 
the development of property rights and other macro-institutional arrangements, or 
upon the conceptualization of a firm's internal organization and mode of doing 
business as the consequence of rational, optimizing decisions, the implicit 
presumption [is] that institutional arrangements are perfectly malleable . . . (David, 
1992, p. 3).
David suggests at least four reasons why one should expect path-dependency in organizations and 
institutions. First, they incorporate shared conventions and mutually consistent expectations grounded 
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in 'shared historical experiences and conscious perceptions of the shared past' (David, 1992, p. 9). 
Second, they provide 'role-typing' and acculturation mechanisms which is a sort of 'sunk capital' of 
organizations (on this point, see also Douglas, 1986). Third, they embody 'codes' for communication 
and information processing (and it is precisely their irreversibility which make them useful: if a 
language could be frequently changed it would become worthless for communication with the 
others!). Fourth, the interrelatedness of different organizational functions— in terms of information 
processing, incentives, roles, etc. (see also above) — self-reinforces specific organizational structures, 
possibly well beyond the time of their purported usefulness.11
6. INCENTIVES VS. AUTHORITY VS. CAPABILITIES  AS  DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOURS AND PERFORMANCES
The foregoing fundamental divides yield also different answers to basic questions such as why 
economic institutions ( and more specifically , formal organizations) other than markets exists , and 
what they do .As extensively discussed above, a good deal of contemporary theory start the 
interpretation of the nature of organizations, including economic organizations  basing it on 
sophisticated, self-seeking, agents. Together, the behaviours of these self-interested actors are viewed 
as typically directed by market forces. Only in those settings in which, due to failures of information 
and contract incompleteness, markets are less effective in this task, are organizations called for to 
surrogate such imperfections. It is a story too familiar to be repeated here.
Conversely, a small—but not negligible and growing—minority of the economic profession has 
identified  the (first approximation) ‘primitives’ of the analysis in the problem-solving features of 
economic organizations , in turn nested in ubiquitous forms of human ‘bounded rationality’, grossly 
imperfect processes of learning and diverse mechanisms of the social distribution of ‘cognitive 
labour’. Needless to say, it is a perspective that finds seminal roots in the works of Herbert Simon, 
James March and indeed Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter.
Let us offer the following caricature to illustrate the differences between the two interpretative 
philosophies. Suppose that two delegations of intelligent but totally uninformed beings from Mars are 
sent to Earth with the mandate of reporting ‘what business firms are’. The delegations are not allowed 
to visit the firms themselves. Rather, the first one is given to read, out of an enormous literature, say, 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Grossman and Hart (1986), while the second is given March and 
Simon (1958), Cyert and March (1963), Nelson and Winter (1982), and Marengo et al.(2000). 
What would they report back to Mars? (We reasonably assume that these entities, given their 
empirical naïveté, are unable to catch all the caveats from footnotes, side remarks, etc.). Well, the first 
delegation would probably convey the idea that earthly firms are places where one confines vicious 
and cunning people who are made to play extremely sophisticated games according to rules designed 
in order to prevent them from doing much harm to themselves and to others. Only casual mention 
would be made—if at all—to conventional labels by which the outcomes are denominated (‘steel’, 
‘shoes’, ‘computers’, and so on), while lengthy accounts would be devoted to the details of the 
admissible rules and the mathematical equipment humans utilize in order to figure out how to behave.
The second delegation is likely to return with a strikingly different story. It would probably begin with 
a rather long description of the impressive variety of ‘things’ that each day come out of earthly firms
—i.e. precisely, steel, computers, polypropylene, etc.—and the equally impressive diversity in the 
processes leading to them. Moreover, these Martians would almost certainly remark that no one has 
the entire plan of what to do in their heads. Most of the members of each organization repeatedly 
undertake recognizably few operations, yet nevertheless organizations co-ordinate their tasks in ways 
generally yielding coherent artefacts at the end of the day. Indeed, this second delegation is likely to 
11 David (1992) uses, appropriately, the analogy with technological relatedness, whereby technical 
interdependence within complex systems makes it hard to change any one component without affecting the 
whole structure.
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suggest the analogy of a ‘firm’ with a messy but most often reliable computer program, with little 
mention of possible conflict of interests among the individual carriers of various ‘subroutines.’
Notwithstanding its being a caricature, the foregoing story does convey the spirit of an actual major 
divide cutting across current theorizing about organizations, having at the two extremes a pure 
incentive-governance view versus a pure problem-solving view.
Clearly, there are elements of truth in both perspectives (Coriat and Dosi, 1998): an ambitious 
research programme ahead entails indeed connecting the two. However, the starting point for such a 
bridge building has important consequences for the sort of bridge that one creates, as it embodies a 
commitment to some assumptions on first-order versus second-order effects. Forced to such a choice, 
we certainly  pick the second Weltanschaung as a provisional point of departure (which also happens 
to be the least explored one). We do need just  to assume a weak incentive compatibility to begin with 
(see Dosi and Marengo, 1995) in the loosest sense that there exists some  pressure ( economic or not )  
generating  some connection between performance and rewards. ( And not even that in all 
institutions : think of the army , where “being good” might imply a higher probability of ending up 
dead. ) However, even having that, one precisely focuses (as a first theoretical approximation) on the 
diverse problem-solving characteristics of different organizations, and only in the second instance one 
tackles the ways in which incentive structures interact with problem-solving knowledge.
Putting it in another way, the archetype ‘incentive view’ fully censors any competence issue 
associated with what organizations do and how well they do it—except for issues of 
misrepresentations of ‘intrinsic’ individual abilities and adverse selection, or incentive misalignment 
in effort elicitation. As an extreme characterization, given the ‘right’ incentives, any firm can make 
microprocessors as well as Intel, or bioengineering  as well as Genetech.
The second, ‘problem-solving’, archetype, on the contrary, censors precisely the incentive-alignment 
issue. In a sense, all agents are ‘angels’ as their motives are concerned. Conversely, it focuses on the 
problem-solving efficacy of what they do, especially in so far as what they do does not stem from any 
differential ‘ontological’ ability but rather from the social division of tasks and their combinatorics. 
So, in the first approximation of this latter view, the basic units of analysis are elementary physical 
acts, such as moving a piece of iron from one place to another, and straightforwardly understood as 
combinations of elementary acts, within a procedure, leading to a feasible outcome (an engine, a 
chemical compound, etc.).12
One can also describe it the other way round. Given all the problem-solving procedures leading to a 
given ‘outcome’ (e.g. an engine, etc., and, for that matter, a theorem, a statement about the purported 
structure of the observed world)—which might well be an infinite set—one may decompose them in 
subsequences of elementary acts of varying length that may be eventually performed according to 
various execution architectures (sequential, parallel, hierarchical, etc.). 
At this level of analysis, an organization embodies problem solving in at least three senses. First, it 
displays the operational competencies associated with its actual problem-solving procedures [much in 
accordance with the routines discussed in Nelson and Winter (1982); see also Cohen et al. (1996)]. 
Secondly, the organizational structure - both the formal and informal ones - determines the 
distribution of informational inputs of the processing tasks and of the ‘allowable acts’ (i.e. ‘who can 
do what to whom’) and, as such, it determines all the decompositions of problem-solving procedures 
that are, so to speak, ‘legal’. Thirdly, it shapes the search heuristics for yet- unsolved problems - e.g. a 
new engine, a new chemical compound - that is, broadly unsolved problems - e.g. a new engine, a 
new chemical compound - that is, broadly speaking, the heuristics of innovative search.
12 See Marengo et al . (2000) for further discussion of this point.
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7. SOME CONCLUSIONS AS AN INVITATION TO JOIN A LARGELY UNEXPLORED RESEARCH 
PROGRAMME 
After the far-reaching insights of the Enlightened Founding Fathers of modern social sciences (also 
meaning inspired by the Enlightenment ), most economists reverted to a new religion, possibly more 
dogmatic than the old one. It is time we go back to and try to rigorously operationalize the intuitions 
of such founding fathers as Smith, Marx, Dewey, Weber, Veblen, Commons, all the way to  
Hirschman, Simon, and a few others, recently rejuvenated by a generation of scholars featuring indeed 
Geoff  Hodgson among the prominent ones.
The vast majority of economists have taken a route which interprets  institutions using an efficiency 
criterion ,  founded on the principles of preference-based individual rationality (possibly suffering 
limitations that require second best institutions) and on  equilibrium. Also evolutionary game-
theoretic accounts of the emergence of institutions just relax the rationality hypothesis, but 
supplement it with an “as-if” account of collective rationality emerging out of the selection process. 
This resulted in a Panglossian approach which assumes that what exists must be efficient at least in 
the long term , even if it has always failed to prove that efficiency will indeed be the outcome of some 
reasonable evolutionary dynamics (as decisively shown by Winter ,1975). Indeed,  the New 
Institutional Economics and Williamson’s Transaction Costs theory is not immune from such 
“Panglossianism”  (as remarked by Granovetter ,1985; and Hodgson,1991).
In such a perspective the market is the only fully efficient first-best institution. Actually, the market 
precedes all other institutions as a sort of state of nature13. Paradoxically this assumption has induced 
economists, including those embracing the New Institutional Economics perspective, to focus mainly 
on the problem of the “nature of the firm” – puzzled by its very existence ! - , and, with much less 
emphasis, on the “nature of the other non-market institutions”, while entirely neglecting the problem 
of the “nature of market” (cf. Hodgson ,1988). If neoclassical economic theory has long suffered from 
a striking  neglect of the institutional nature of firms, still today is mostly suffering from a perhaps 
even more astonishing neglect of the institutional nature of the market. Even Douglass North , points 
out this paradoxical state of affairs: “All the modern neoclassical literature discusses the firm as a 
substitute for the market [and] ignores a crucial fact of history: hierarchical organization forms and 
contractual arrangements in exchange pre-date the price making market’
In our view the major challenge ahead is  develop and operationalize a rigorous theory of the nature 
and dynamics of institutions which departs from any ( undemonstrated )  postulate of efficiency and 
market centrality and addresses the coevolution of organizations , “forms of rationality”, preferences  
and technologies, i.e. precisely those elements that the neoclassical theory, but also a large part of the 
New Institutional Economics, consider as exogenously given “primitives”. An important corollary is 
the institutional embeddedness of techno-economic change. The standard view is that technology is 
exogenously determined and sets the constraints which organizations optimally adapt to (and even 
attempts to make it “endogenous” , rationalize it as the outcome of an optimal forward looking 
allocation of resources) . Contrast this view with the alternative one, supported by vast empirical 
evidence, that these techno-economic changes are largely influenced by the institutional arrangements 
at all levels: national and international institutions, scientific and technological communities, 
organizational forms, work relations, etc. . The cumulative and path-dependent pattern of change 
shapes  the set of possible trajectories, while the ubiquitous complementarities among institutions, 
technologies, values, norms  determine a multiplicity of evolutionary paths. Institutions are “the 
carriers of history” ( David,1994) , which well survive beyond any original “efficiency”, if they ever 
had one .
Last but not least, institutions shape and constrain the processes of self-organized coordination which 
socio-economic dynamics typically display. We have been beating enough the purported dead horses 
13 “In the beginning, there were the markets” (Williamson, 1975, p. 20)
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of decision-theoretic and game-theoretic interpretations. Rather,  in multi-agents set-ups,   
coordination is typically  the outcome of self-organizing processes stemming from the local 
interactions among agents. Kirman ( 2011) makes a general, very convincing , case to the point – from 
bees and ants all the way to markets in general and financial markets in  particular - . The focus, in 
this perspective, and rightly so, is on the aggregate orderly properties of local interactions, with not 
too much attention on the background constraints. So, of course, it would be meaningless to start 
describing the fascinating self-organizing order in the flights of flocks of birds by their constraints . 
By the same token, however, at the opposite extreme it would be equally foolish to start the 
description of a camp of war prisoners or Sing Sing inmates focusing on their self-organizing patterns, 
even if there often are indeed also under the most constraining institutional structures ( Recall  the 
tragic account of a nazi lager by Levi, 1959 ).
Most human institutions are placed in between the two foregoing extremes: the interpretative 
challenge is indeed to understand the varying balances between distributed agency, if any, on the one 
hand; hard institutional, typically hierarchical, constraining institutions, on the other (indeed major 
anthropological studies such as Malinowski ,1922;  and Levi-Strauss,1973,  seems to suggest not 
much room for individual agency) and possibly their coupled dynamics, again when there is any .
We do believe that research in these directions would draw social sciences  back to  the “Enlightened  
Fathers” paradigm,   and away  from the dogmatic stalemate in which today they are  largely 
confined.
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